Posts Tagged ‘Mayo’

Dublin v Mayo AI Final 2017

September 19, 2017

Unfortunately I won’t be in a position to do a half decent write up until much later in the week so below are the usual battery of stats/tables. I will do up a write up at some stage and post it here – mainly for reference when these teams meet in 2018!!!

Listening and reading to some of the coverage post the final what jumps out to me is

O’Connor’s free at the end was outside his range – see the preview. It is so harsh on O’Connor that he takes a hit for stepping up to cover his team’s deficiencies and in some way lessens what he does elsewhere – see his brilliant long range point to draw the game level at the end.

Take a look at the assists table for players who had hugely impactful, under the radar, game

Mayo’s shooting was not poor! It was better than both 2016 AI Finals … it was just that Dublin’s shooting was exceptional. At one stage in the second half they were 0 – 11 from 12 for a Conversion Rate of 92%. Collective ice in their veins.

Overview

Kickouts

Dublin attack

Shot Chart

Shooting Table

Assists

Mayo attack

Shot Chart

Shooting Table

Assists

Advertisements

Dublin v Mayo 2017 All ireland preview

September 14, 2017

Immediate post-game reactions and numbers from the 2016 final can be found here (drawn game) and here (replay). Both will be referenced heavily below

Dublin Attack

We’ll get into the constituent parts below but as a collective Dublin have returned a whopping 61% Conversion Rate so far in 2017. The 188 shots they have attempted has netted them 19 points more (Expt Pts +19.05) than the average intercounty team would have scored. This Dublin attack is rolling.

Point attempts from play

Table 1 in the Appendix shows the breakdown per player but as a collective over two thirds (+13.87) of Dublin’s positive Expt Pts has come from their point attempts from play. The average Conversion Rate over the past 5 years has been 46%; thus far Dublin have returned 56%. The question is not how good they are – we know they are exceptional – but whether they can maintain that level of production?

And it is an open question as we have seen this before. Coming into both the 2015 and 2016 finals Dublin’s forwards were also flying with pre final Conversion Rates of 57% in 2015 (Expt Pts +17.63) and 51% in 2016 (Expt Pts +8.25). In the 2015 final they were impressive in maintaining their high returns with a 57% Conversion Rate (0 – 08 from 14) and a one game Expt Pts of +1.57 (in poor weather it must be remembered). However in the two games against Mayo last year they stumbled to a very poor 37% (0 – 14 from 38; Expt Pts -4.72).

The question is whether this stumble was induced by facing Mayo or was it more of a Dublin blip? There is no way to categorically state either way but looking from the outside I would give Mayo a great deal of credit. Coming into the 2016 final Mayo, in their six games, had allowed a Conversion Rate of 41% (0 – 45 from 109) as opposed to the 51% Dublin had been putting up. Across the two games the 37% Dublin achieved was much more in line with what Mayo had been allowing.

We have a similar scenario this year. Dublin are flying with the aforementioned Conversion Rate of 56% but again over a nine game span Mayo’s defence have only allowed a Conversion Rate of 41% (which, as an aside, shows remarkable consistency year to year). Can Mayo repeat their 2016 trick and “drag” Dublin’s Conversion Rate down in the final?

In an effort to explain the drop in Dublin’s shooting I created a pressure index (see Note1) and noted that Mayo were consistent across the two games in applying strong or severe pressure to just under half of Dublin’s point attempts (45% in the drawn game and 44% in the replay). In 2017 – across the nine games – Mayo have applied strong or severe pressure to 46% of their opponents point attempts. This has risen to 59% in the last four games.

So we know that Dublin can shoot and that they can carry it over (2015 final) however we also know that Mayo stymied them in both games last year and that the pressure index for their 2017 season is trending upwards.

One difference, for Dublin, observed when comparing this year to the last two All Irelands is just who is taking the shots. Below are the top 5 point takers coming into the last three finals and whilst there was a change from ’15 to ’16 the new entrants then were generally known quantities in McManamon & Rock. With Connolly suspended and Brogan & McManamon mainly coming off the bench there is a newer, fresher, look to the Dublin strike force.

Mannion & Andrews are well known to the Mayo defenders at this stage but O’Callaghan – despite there being a mountain of video evidence on him – is new and may cause the Mayo defenders to sit off initially; remember it was the relatively unknown Costelloe off the bench that did the damage in last year’s replay.

Deadballs

Given their experience, both last year and in their run to the final this year, Mayo may believe that they can handle the Dublin forwards. But what they will have to be very conscious of is fouling. Rock had a poor day in last year’s drawn game (0 – 03 from 7 (43%); Expt Pts of -1.58) but was then devastating in the replay (0 – 07 from 7 with an Expt Pts of +1.58).

He, and Dublin as a whole, have maintained this form throughout the 2017 Championship returning a barely credible 94% Conversion Rate (0 – 33 from 35) with an Expt Pts of +6.43 (see Chart 1 in the Appendix).
A special note of praise for Rock here. Although he had an off day in the 2016 drawn final he has been phenomenal since basically being removed from free taking duties at the back end of 2015. In 11 Championship games since the start of 2016 he is 92% and as the below graphic shows he is not only consistent “inside” where he is 96% but also outside (75%). Not only has he accuracy but he has accuracy with length.

Mayo cannot hope that the Rock from the drawn 2016 final appears. Instead they must expect that the Rock we have seen from the start of 2016, and in the 2016 replay, shows up. They gave up seven scoreable frees in the replay; in 2017 they have given up an average of 6.6 shots at goal from frees. Unless defending a lead their target has to be to minimise Rock’s opportunities from frees to seven or less.

Goal attempts

Dublin have – surprisingly given their opposition and reputation – only been average on goal attempts. In 2015 they were averaging 6.0 shots at goal per game but had a phenomenal 60% Conversion Rate (18 – 04 from 30). In 2016 this reduced dramatically to 2.2 attempts & a 46% (5 – 00 from 11) Conversion Rate. So far this year it is back up to 5.0 attempts a game but with a basically average Conversion Rate of 36% (9 – 01 from 25). In the 2015 final they manufactured 4 goal attempts but couldn’t convert any whilst in the two 2016 games they only created four distinct attempts at goal – but did manage to score in the most unconventional manner!

It’s all a bit of a rollercoaster. I think it is fair to say that Dublin are a lot less goal hungry than previous incarnations but this year has seen them somewhat pick up their attempts per game.

Mayo attack

Whereas Dublin are on fire Mayo have been hotter and colder, both from game to game and within games, than any other team. They returned a Conversion Rate of 41% against Galway and 71% against Cork; they scored 1 – 09 from just 12 shots in extra time against Derry after producing 0 – 01 from 15 attempts in a 25 minute spell in the second half. Against Cork they scored 0 -14 from their first 15 point attempts from play.

Mayo are the walking embodiment of the fact that you can twist stats to back up any argument

Point attempts from play

Looking at the nine games in the round (see Table 2 in the appendix) however we can say that their point taking has been just above average (50% Conversion Rate; +2.21 Expt Pts). But this is a step up on their 2016 campaign (46% Conversion Rate; +1.62).

There’s a slight anomaly in the above figures in that Mayo’s Conversion Rate has increased but the Expt Pts has remained more or less static. That’s because Mayo have attempted much more shots from central locations this year compared to last year. In a most Un-Mayo like fashion they have made life easier on themselves!

If we run an imaginary line vertically from the outer edges of the D to the 45m line we create a central channel. In 2016 34% of Mayo’s point attempts came from inside this channel. In 2017 this has risen to 51%.

A lot has been made of Mayo’s reliance on Moran and C O’Connor. Between them they have attempted 32% of Mayo’s point attempts returning 34% of their scores however in truth this is not too far removed from Dublin’s spread. Dublin have relied on O’Callaghan & Mannion for 29% of their point attempts and 30% of their scores. Now the argument can be made that Dublin have more alternatives in Connolly, Brogan, Kilkenny, Rock, Andrews et al should you shut the front two down – and that’s fair – but there are only so many shots to go around. And as good a unit as Kerry’s defence couldn’t shut them down. Moran & C O’Connor took 28% of Mayo’s point attempts across the two semi-finals with a combined Conversion Rate of 72% and Expt Pts of +2.89

Another notable point re Mayo’s shooting is that the “back-up”, the next ten players by shot volume (see Table2 in the Appendix), have been as accurate as Moran & C O’Connor with a 53% Conversion Rate (0 – 55 from 104) compared to Moran/C O’Connor’s 54% (0-34 from 63). Have Mayo got two top shooters? Yes. Have they ready-made, volume based replacements if they are shut down? No. Can the workload be spread and the efficiency maintained if they are shut down? Yes.

What of the Dublin defence? Coming into the 2016 final Mayo were running at an about average Conversion Rate of 45% (Expt Pts +0.89). For the two finals their combined numbers were 0 – 14 from 31 (Conversion Rate of 45%; Expt Pts of +0.22). The sample size is small but Dublin’s defence had no real additional effect on Mayo’s efficiency – Mayo carried over their conversion rate. Where they did have an effect however was in limiting the attempts Mayo had. Coming into the 2016 final Mayo had taken 20.7 point attempts per game. In the final this dropped to 15.5.

This year so far Mayo have averaged (again with remarkable consistency) 20.5 point attempts per game. In 2016 Dublin – prior to the final – had allowed the opposition to take 16.6 point attempts per game but this has risen to 18.6 in 2017. So not only has Mayo’s efficiency on the same volume of shots increased but Dublin are allowing more shots and (in 2016 at least) didn’t have an effect on Mayo’s efficiency.

Deadballs

C O’Connor has been rock steady on frees throughout his career converting, when the pressure has been at its most intense, 86% (0-55 from 64 Expt Pts of +4.99) in semi-final and finals alone from 2012 to 2016. His range does appear to have shortened however.

The above chart shows C O’Connor’s 2017 frees in yellow and using the same boundaries as the Rock chart above we can see that O’Connor is as good as ever “inside”. He has recorded very similar numbers to Rock at 95% (0 – 35 from 37) however he has definitely struggled “outside” recording a very poor (relatively speaking) 35%.
The two black dots on the chart are Jason Doherty’s attempts in the semi-final replay versus Kerry whilst the red cross is the free that O’Connor missed at the death in last year’s replay. As discussed at the time you would not have wanted anyone else standing over that free given his performance in the most pressurised of stages previously but it was definitely on the outer edge of his range.

Given his range limitations, his record this year and how comfortable Doherty looked the last day surely there’s a case for handing over the longer range attempts?

Apart from C O’Connor’s range – which does look to have a ready-made alternative should Mayo wish to employ Doherty – another area of concern would be frees from the right. Attempts from this area are sparse in the above chart (C O’Connor handed the ball to Moran for at least one free from this area against Kerry) as you would imagine C O’Connor is only too aware of his limitations. The issue was only exasperated by McLoughlin missing his two frees from inside the 20m on the right against Derry and Sligo.

Everyone knows O’Connor doesn’t want to take frees from wide right whilst the alternative, in McLoughlin, has, being kind, been shaky. Mayo know this is a weakness. We know it. You can be damn well sure that the Dublin defence knows it too.

Goal attempts

Mayo have been slightly below Dublin in their attempts per game at 4.2 however have been ahead of Dublin with a Conversion Rate of 42% (16 – 03 from 38 attempts). In the round that’s 5.6pts per game from both for their goal attempts (Dublin 5.60, Mayo 5.67).

Kickouts

One of the most eagerly anticipated duals will be the kickouts. How successful will Mayo be at getting their, what at times look extremely dicey, short kickouts away? Will they push up on Dublin? Once won how good will each team be at manoeuvring the subsequent possession into a shot and score?

Dublin Kickouts

See appendix for raw numeric tables

To date Dublin have gone short (see Note 2) on 66% (63 from 96) of their kickouts winning them all and managing to produce a shot from 73% which resulted in 3-27. That’s 0.57 points for every kickout won. Which is incredible. The returns for all other kickouts won is 0.45 – which doesn’t account for the kickouts the lost when the ball went past the 45 – whilst Mayo are a net (unlike Dublin they have lost 9 of their own short kickouts which has resulted in the opposition getting 0 – 03) 0.33 points per short kickout.

You have to imagine that Mayo will look to disrupt this wherever they can. To date 50% of the opposition’s kickouts have gone short in Mayo games with the opposition getting 0.31 points per kickout won. Mayo have gotten their hands on 10% (12 out of 120) of the opposition’s kickouts and when they do they go for goal – scoring 2 – 03 off those 12.
In the two finals last year Dublin had a similar split to this year in that 65% of their kickouts went short but Mayo had much more success keeping Dublin to just 0.12 points per short kickout won (0 – 03 off 25). And that’s without referencing the two short ones that Mayo won.

When we compare this to what Dublin have done to date in the 2017 Championship you have to believe that whilst Mayo may not be able to stop Dublin completely, and may not be able to clamp down as rigidly as they did last year, they should at least provide a much more substantial obstacle than Dublin have faced hitherto fore.

Mayo kickouts

Across both 2016 games Mayo lost five (17%) of their 29 short kickouts against Dublin including two at the death of the drawn game that surely had a part to play in Clarke being dropped for the replay. Clarke is now firmly ensconced as Mayo’s No.1 but the short kickout roulette can still occur at any moment as they have lost 9 across six different games.

Mayo have been somewhat fortunate in that none of those 14 lost short kickouts (5 against Dublin and 9 this year) have resulted in a goal – instead 0 – 08 has come from them – but it is only a matter of time. But Mayo will continue to roll that dice, even in the face of the Dublin pressure, as it has served them well overall. Whilst not as spectacular as Dublin’s 0.57 Mayo have returned 0.39 points for every short kickout won this year.

That does rise to 0.43 for their own kickouts that they win past the 45 however they only win 63% of these – for all the anxiety they give their fans on the short ones they are still winning 90%. It’s almost a no brainer. No matter how many palpitations they give you if your returns are the same on the short ones as on the longer ones but you win more of the short ones – well you keep going short. That is until you give away the inevitable calamitous goal … let’s hope for Mayo’s sake their luck holds for one more game.


Appendix

Table 1 – Dublin point attempts by player

Chart 1 – Dublin 2017 deadballs

Table 2 – Mayo point attempts by player

Table 3 – Dublin 2017 kickout overview

Table 4 – Mayo 2017 kickout overview

Note 1 – Pressure Index explanation; this is a subjective metric where the pressure applied to a shot from play is given a range from 0 to 3. Very generally
• 0 = no pressure applied,
• 1 = very little (e.g. a player running alongside but not tackling)
• 2 = strong (e.g. on the shoulder, catching the shooters eye by flying in to tackle)
• 3 = intense (e.g. a block, delivering a shoulder just as the shot is being taken)

It does come with a warning as it is subjective but seeing as there is only one person applying the metric you would expect that there would be a level of consistency when a large enough volume of shots is reviewed.

Note 2 – Kickout definition
• Short = ball landing inside the 45
• Mid = ball landing between the 45 & 65
• Long – ball landing past the 65

Again some judgement is required for contested balls around the 45/65 but on a large enough dataset any kinks will be lost to the averages

Mayo v Kerry 2017 AI SF Replay

August 28, 2017

Styles make fights. It’s an old adage but one that has endured because there is such an element of truth in it. How else to explain away how a game between two teams differs so much from one week to the next. In the drawn tie there were a total of 103 possessions with 47 turnovers. Kerry won the possession battle 54 – 49. Here there was a total of 87 possessions – with Mayo winning that battle 47 to 40 – and 31 turnovers. There was just 9 (9!!) turnovers in the first 35 minutes.

There are many minor elements throughout a game that will lead to such variances but the main variable that changes was in how Kerry set up. They started with an extra man back to cut off the kicked ball into Mayo’s forwards. The knock effect of this was that (a) Mayo’s kickouts were less frantic and (b) Mayo countered by playing more of a possession game. Both elements ensuring there were less turnovers.

More on the kickouts later but to my mind Mayo showed their collective football intelligence by changing their style to suit the additional element of Kerry playing one back. They played a game we don’t normally associate with them – keep ball. In the drawn game they had just the four (8% of all possessions) team possessions where there were at least 12 player possessions. Only one occurred in the first half of that game. In the replay that rose to eight (17%) with five in the first half.

Now 12 is an arbitrary number used to illustrate a point but that point is further bolstered by the fact that in the seven games prior to the semi-final that percentage (of team possessions with >12 player touches) was just over 8%. Mayo changed their natural game to play what was in front of them. And executed it with intelligence and no small degree of precision.

Mayo attack

A very clinical outing from Mayo scoring 0 -04 more than would have been expected from the shots they attempted. From an Expt Pts perspective the majority of the gains came from their goal attempts where three shots produced 2 – 00. Over the two games Mayo had eight shots on goal scoring 4 – 01 with an Expt Pts of +3.22 (Note; Expt Pts is less reliable on goal attempts than point attempts – as will be seen when we come onto Kerry). Even if they don’t manage to maintain the same high conversion rate Mayo will want to carry the volume of attempts through to the final as this was a weakness against Dublin last year. Over the 140 minutes of the replay and drawn game against Dublin they only manufactured three shots at goal returning 1- 01.

Another area that Mayo will be happier with now is their deadball striking. In the first game C O’Connor hit just
25% off a very low volume (0 – 01 from four; free x3 & 1 x 45) whilst his returns for the year badly lagged previous seasons (67% Success Rate & Expt Pts of -3.87).

Here he was 0 – 06 from seven attempts (86%) though with an Expt Pts return of +0.19 he would have been expected to score 0 – 06. His one missed attempt was again outside his range in being a 45 to the left of centre.

Jason Doherty’s two points (0 – 02 from 2; Expt Pts +0.66) were excellent – especially the first free from the left as Kerry had reduced the gap to four points at that stage by scoring the previous two and would have gotten a huge lift if Mayo had missed an opportunity through their main free taker being off the field.

Given O’Connor’s long distance travails the consummate ease with which he converted the second attempt, a 45, might give Mayo management a decision to make on the longer ones come the final.

In the drawn game Mayo’s point attempts were very good returning 52% (0 – 12 from 23; Expt Pts +1.03). They stepped back ever so slightly here returning 50% (0 – 08 from 16; Expt Pts of +0.78) but not to any degree that would be alarming.

Although their shooting form has waxed and waned throughout the campaign, and indeed throughout certain games, they have been very consistent at a macro level. In the seven games coming into the semi-final they were converting point attempts at a 49% clip (Combined Expt Pts of -0.40). In the two SFs here they were a combined 51% (Ext Pts of +1.83). In the final they will be looking to hold onto this 50% as a minimum – over the 140 minutes against Dublin last year they were 45% (0 – 14 from 31; Expt Pts -0.22). Marginal gains and all but … that uplift from 45% to 51% could be the difference in a one point defeat over 140 minutes and a one point victory in 70 minutes.

Kerry’s attack

Kerry’s numbers are an absolute contradiction with a very high conversion rate at 59% but a horrible Expt Pts of -5.29. The negative Expt Pts can be entirely explained through their goal attempts. They had four separate instances where they were through on goal, producing six shots, but came away empty handed. Of the six only Peter Crowley’s attempt – immediately after Mayo’s first goal – could be considered anyway clear cut. Geaney’s movement, in such a confined space, was nothing short of remarkable for the attempt that Boyle stopped on the line but it was far from what could be described as a “gilt edged” opportunity. Similarly the three attempts around the 45th minute that Clarke, and a plethora of defenders, kept out were, in the main, instinctive snap shots. Geaney had another attempt from out wide at the death but there again there was a whole host of Mayo bodies in the way.

Looking ahead to the final this will (should!) be an area of concern for Mayo. Although the quality of attempts here was low the six shots do add to the four Kerry had in the first game. We know how devastating Dublin can be when they scythe through teams – Mayo cannot afford to offer up four/five/six shots on goal to Dublin as they did to Kerry. (On the credit side of this argument is that Mayo only faced 11 goal attempts in their seven matches pre the semi-final and four in the two games against Dublin last year)

Leaving the goal attempts to one side Kerry were an incredible 74% (0 – 17 from 23; Expt Pts +1.97) on the remainder of the shots. We have seen that Mayo – on a combined 51% – had a combined Expt Pt close to Kerry’s with a 74% Success Rate. How so? Kerry achieved their 74% on very simple shots. The complete shot chart is in the appendix but below are all their 2nd half attempts – it comprises of goal attempts, tap overs and simple frees. There is only one shot from outside ~25metres. They went for goal too soon and too often.

Kerry struggled collectively the last day on their point taking (40%; 0 – 08 from 20) but coming into the semi-final they were on fire with a combined 71%. Yes the defences they faced were of a lesser variety than Mayo’s but they really should have been in a position to back themselves and keep the scoreboard ticking over.

Kickouts

Mayo (when compared with the outputs from the drawn game) wiped the floor with Kerry. They got 15 of their 23 kickouts away short with, unlike in the drawn game, quite a number coming under little or no pressure. That first game saw them score 1 – 06 from the 13 short ones that they won. They were less productive here scoring “just” the 0 – 04 on their own short kickouts but where they really dominated was on the mid/long range.

In total there were 19 kickouts that went past the 45 – with Mayo winning 13 (six on their own kickout to just one for Kerry and seven on Kerry’s kickout to just the five for Kerry). And when they won them they went for the jugular getting nine shots off and scoring 1 – 05. That’s 1 – 09 from kickouts both days. Why the turnaround? It is very hard to say watching TV footage but there appears to have been a convergence of Kerry getting caught between roles following their decision to play with an extra back plus Mayo going back to brass tacks (if you get a chance to re-watch Peter Canavan’s piece on Sky on how simple some of the “bunched” routines were it is well worth it).

One area that might give Mayo something to ponder is the fact that Kerry moved the ball quite well from their own short kickouts. Kerry won 11 converting eight to shots and scoring 0 – 06. Or 0.55 points per kickout won. In fairness this appears to be a blip as Mayo were giving up 0.28 points per short kickout in the prior eight games this year but still there are always those edges to be gained ….

APPENDIX

Game overview

Kerry’s shot chart

Mayo’s shot chart

x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

Mayo v Kerry 2017 AI SF

August 22, 2017

Kerry’s attack

Coming into the game one of the biggest disparities was in Kerry’s Conversion Rate versus what Mayo had allowed up to that point. In their three 2017 Championship games Kerry were running at a massively impressive 67% clip (both on total shots attempted as well as on point attempts from play) whilst Mayo were giving up 49% (a meagre 39% from play). Something had to give.

Kerry ended up with 2-14, a Conversion Rate of 50% and an Expt Pts tally of +0.37; not often you would consider letting in 2-14 a good result but Kerry’s returns were essentially average. On top of the overall lower conversion rate Kerry only hit 40% (0 – 08 from 20) on their point attempts. Advantage Mayo’s defence. Mayo did however give up eight shots from frees whilst Kerry created three clear cut goal opportunities (three shots on goal and Buckley’s converted follow up). So maybe more of an honourable draw with Mayo shading it.

Again coming into the game P Geaney & J O’Donoghue were the Kerry forwards’ standard bearers taking 40% of Kerry’s point attempts with a combined 64% Conversion Rate (Expt Pts of +4.44). Mayo managed to keep a lid on them as together Geaney & O’Donoghue “only” accounted for 30% of Kerry’s point attempts though their accuracy was as good as ever (0 – 04 from 6; 67% Conversion Rate & Expt pts of +1.44). That “keeping a lid” does come with a qualifier however; 0 – 03 came directly from frees where either were fouled.

There is plenty of commentary on the merit or otherwise of placing A O’Shea on Donaghy. Looking purely at the figures coming into the game Donaghy had taken just three shots in 124 minutes of action – scoring 1-2 mind – whilst also having eight primary and three secondary assists. Here in just over 70 minutes he scored just 0 – 01 but managed three shots and as can be seen from the assists table below he was Kerry’s puppet master with six primary and two secondary assists.

Kerry assist table

Undoubtedly the three shots were from less productive areas as Donaghy roamed given that Kerry had switched away from the high ball – but that is a minimal gain. Donaghy had a hand in all three goal opportunities and was the dominant Kerry presence in the forwards.

Mayo’s attack

Coming into the game Mayo had converted 53% of their shots (49% of point attempts) whilst Kerry had allowed 47% (40% on point attempts). Here Mayo had a combined 50% with 52% from point attempts. Advantage Mayo

Moran & O’Connor’s accuracy up front was excellent scoring 0 – 07 from 8 point attempts (88% Conversion Rate with an Expt Pts of +3.21) whilst overall, when including goal chances, they produced a combined 75% Conversion Rate (1 – 08 from 12) and Expt Pts of +2.37. You will go a long way to find better returns from a front two in such a big game.

Of course (there’s always a caveat!) if O’Connor & Moran were sublime, but Mayo were more or less bang on average, that means that there were issues elsewhere. The most noticeable was their deadball accuracy. They had three frees and one 45 with O’Connor only converting 1.

This is – worryingly for Mayo – now becoming a trend. Attached are all O’Connor’s deadball attempts this year with the ones in the Kerry game highlighted in black. Previously we highlighted that O’Connor has a definite arc outside of which he is vulnerable. That arc is as evident in 2017 as it ever was.

O’Connor 2017 deadball chart

Outside of Moran & O’Connor Mayo were 33% (0- 05 from 15; Expt Pts of -2.18) which is well down on how they were doing coming into the game (49% & an Expt Pts +0.97). It is hard to see Moran & O’Connor being as productive the next day but even if they do “slack” somewhat the expectation is that the rest of the team will improve.

Areas of improvement for the replay

As already intimated Mayo will need more from the supporting cast from play whilst also getting more than just 0 – 01 from whatever deadballs they have. But there’s also the issue of their discipline. They gave up the eight shots from frees but some of those were, to use a technical term, just dumb – especially in the first half. After going ahead by 1 -01 they gave up an off the ball free just outside the D and then managed to give up an extra 13m for a free out towards the wing that brought the ball right onto the D. Two simple tap overs, lead halved and Kerry were up and running. This doesn’t account for the one where Vaughan dived at O’Donoghue’s feet from behind.

As an aside this is not the first time that 13m was tagged on to an important free – the equalising score for Cork came from a free just outside the 45 that had had 13m tagged on. Gotta cut out the dumb sh*t in the replay.

Kerry? They will be disappointed in their shooting. Dropping from 67% on point attempts in the three previous games to 40% here can be somewhat accounted for by the conditions and the step up in defensive quality however quite a bit of the drop can be credited to Kerry themselves.

Kerry pt attempts from play – pressure/no pressure

Of their 20 point attempts 45% were taken under little or no pressure (white in the above chart) with just a 33% Conversion Rate. The three converted were by P Geaney, BJ Keane and K Young (with his right!!) but it was the ones that were missed (Moran & Donaghy x2, Maher & Morley x1) that Kerry will need to tighten up on.

Kickouts

The main focus during the game was on Mayo’s kickouts where Kerry applied huge amounts of pressure pushing up on the short ones in an effort to force Mayo to go longer. When Clarke did have to go longer Kerry lorded it winning 8 of 11 (73%) that passed the 45. But the reason for Kerry pushing up so hard was evident in what Mayo did with the short ones they won. Of the 13 they got away they managed to get ten attacks, eight shots and scored 1- 06. Unbelievable returns.

Playing the short one as much as Mayo do – 109 so far in their eight games – they’ll always run the gauntlet of the calamitous one. Kerry got a point from the one short kickout they intercepted; to date Mayo have lost 9 (8% of all short kickouts taken) and given up 0 – 07. A goal will eventually come but the credit balance is such that Mayo really should just accept when it happens (though doing everything in their power to prevent it) and stick to the plan.

One point to note is how Mayo fared over the two halves. In the first half Mayo only got 46% (6 of 13) of kickouts away short but in the second half that rose to 73% (8 of 11). The high press game is very tiring and a combination of Kerry fatigue, and Mayo alertness to what they were doing, ensured a much more productive second half

Less newsworthy in the post-game reaction was how good Mayo were on Kerry’s kickouts. When Kerry went past the 45 Mayo essentially broke even (Kerry won 7 getting 5 shots; Mayo won 6 getting 4 shots from same) but they were more impressive in what they did to Kerry’s short ones. Kerry had 11 but only converted three to a shot.

APPENDIX

Game overview

Kerry’s shot chart

Mayo’s shot chart

x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

Mayo assists

Mayo v Roscommon 2017 AI QF

July 31, 2017

For those new to the blog, or who haven’t been here for a while, please find a refresher on the definitions and how the numbers are compiled here

Team Possessions Attacks Shots Scores Exp Pts
Roscommon 56 43 24 2 – 09 13.23
Mayo 54 42 29 1 – 12 14.46

Both teams had similar possession volumes (56 for Roscommon to Mayo’s 54) as well as Attack Rates (77% v 78%). Once inside the 45 there was a divergence however with Mayo getting more shots off (29 to Roscommon’s 25).

As an aside 110 possessions is high but not inordinately so. Across 54 games in 2015 and 2016 I have eight with a higher possession total including the 2015 final between Kerry & Dublin which was played in similarly wet conditions. The Connacht game ths year between Mayo & Galway had 113.

Mayo attack

As ever we start with Cillian O’Connor. One of his less auspicious days with a total Conversion Rate of 27% (0 – 03 from 11; Expt Pts – 2.91) and just 14% from play (0 – 01 from 7; Expt Pts -1.94). In eight games in 2016 he returned a combined conversion rate of 62% (0 – 44 from 71) with an Expt Pts tally of -0.93.

As ever his appetite for work and willingness to offer himself up as an option were evident as he took four of Mayo’s last six shots (Durcan took the other two) from the 65th minute onwards. One of these shots was a free from well outside his range whilst the other three were central enough however two were taken under strong or intense pressure. Indeed five of his seven attempts from play were heavily pressurised. If you’re Mayo you probably want O’Connor on the ball at the death but the opposition are well aware of this.

In a down game for O’Connor Lee Keegan almost single-handedly dragged Mayo back from the abyss scoring 1 – 03 from just five shots (80% Conversion Rate; Expt Pts +3.25). The goal was a prime example of split second decision making that can win/lose/decide games.

In the above Keegan’s (5) marker Enda Smith (9) gets sucked into the kickout melee unaware that Doherty has claimed a mark. Keegan sees it and immediately sets off behind Smith’s back. McDermott (Roscommon defender pointing) sees the danger but it is too late. Keegan is gone with nothing but open road in front of him.

The remainder of the Mayo team were average scoring 0 – 06 from 13 (46% Conversion Rate; Expt Pts of +0.10). None of the starting trio of McLoughlin, A O’Shea or S O’Shea managed a shot whilst only Tom Parsons produced one off the bench. Mayo will definitely be looking for more of a threat here the next day.

On McLoughlin & A O’Shea the fact that they didn’t get a shot off does not necessarily mean they had a poor game. Both were very involved higher up the pitch as evidenced by the assist chart.

Roscommon’s defence may be slightly disappointed in the fact that 46% (11 of 24) of Mayo’s shots were taken under little or no pressure however on the flip side they will be delighted in where they forced Mayo to shoot from. Mayo never really got through them or around the side – the vast majority of shots were from “outside”.

Roscommon attack

At a macro level Roscommon’s shooting was very good with them scoring ~1.7 points more than the shots they attempted would normally return. But their Conversion Rate was essentially average at 46% and therein lies a problem. Their high returns from goal attempts (2 – 00 from 2) masks how poor their shooting in general was. They had 16 point attempts from play and returned just 0 – 05 (31% Conversion Rate; Expt Pts -2.42).

It is quite possible, in a one off game in the replay, that they will again create more goal chances than Mayo and convert them all. It is much more likely however that they will revert to the mean on their goal attempt conversions and thus they will have to rely more heavily on the point taking (be that from play of from frees).

One point to note here is the affect that Mayo’s defence had on Roscommon. Above we showed how Roscommon helped themselves by keeping Mayo, in the main, on the outer perimeter. Roscommon got inside Mayo more often (see shot chart below) but the Mayo defense deserves credit as they heavily pressurised 75% (12 of 16) of Roscommon’s point attempts. This included a ~35 minute period post the second goal where they heavily pressurised 8 of Roscommon’s next 10 point attempts leading to Roscommon returns of 10% Conversion Rate (0 – 01 from 10) with a combined Expt Pts of -3.31.

Now undoubtedly there was “scoreboard pressure” as Mayo overturned the 7 point deficit that led to poor decisions and execution in the shots but Mayo definitely aided those poor decisions.

75% heavy pressure is high and at times they walked a bit of a tightrope offering up six attempts from a free with four coming inside the 45 – but you’ll take a combined return of 41% ( 0 – 09 from 22) from all point attempts.

Kickouts

Very even all told. 20 kickouts went passed the 45 with both teams winning 10 each. As with the general trend mentioned above Mayo were better at converting those possessions to shots.

In an interview post the Cork game Rochford mentioned, in assessing A O’Shea’s impact, how he had aided smaller things such as winning the throw in. Here Roscommon not only won both throw ins but scored off both as well.

APPENDIX
Roscommon’s shot chart

Mayo’s shot chart

x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

Galway v Mayo 2017 Connacht

June 13, 2017

For those new to the blog, or who haven’t been here for a while, please find a refresher on the definitions and how the numbers are compiled here

Team Possessions Attacks Shots Scores Exp Pts
Galway 59 37 28 0 – 15 15.23
Mayo 54 39 29 1 – 11 16.89

Outside of a few extra possessions both sides had an eerily similar outing to that of their 2016 encounter. In that game Galway had a 64% attack rate (v 63% here), 78% shot rate (v 76%) and a 52% conversion rate (v 54%) though their Expt Pts at ~11 was much lower in 2016 than the ~15 points here. Part of that divergence in Expt Pts was the fact that in 2016 Galway scored 1 – 01 from their two goal chances; here they missed the one lone attempt, from a relatively acute angle, by Gary O’Donnell early in the second half. Those three shots alone equate to a swing of 2.79 Expt Pts.

What of Mayo? In 2016 they recorded an attack rate of 79% (v 72% here) and a shot rate of 66% (v 74%). A slight adjustment on how they moved the ball in that they got inside Galway’s 45 at a lesser rate but managed more shots whilst in there however ultimately the net result was the same – 29 shots in both games. Again there are similarities in their shooting; getting 12 scores in both games for a conversion rate of 41% whilst the Expt pts was -2.89 in 2017 and -3.20 in 2016.

The more things change the more they stay the same.

Mayo’s shooting

Mayo’s goal & deadball attempts were average – which given the prevailing conditions in Salthill was probably better than could be expected. They scored 1 goal from their three attempts whilst Cillian O’Connor returned 0 – 05 from his 7 deadball attempts with both misses coming from the 45 and beyond. As stated a reasonable, acceptable, standard day.

What let them down, badly, was their point taking. In total they scored 0 – 06 from 19 attempts for a conversion rate of 32% (Expt Pts of -2.78). You could blame the conditions – and they were very difficult – but Galway had a stat line of 0 – 07 from 17 (41% conversion rate; -0.30 Expt Pts. Basically average). You could also blame shot selection but again the Expt Pts shows that they should have returned 0 -10 from the shots attempted. Where they took their shots from was not an issue. There was a degree of difficulty added by the conditions but nothing that would compensate for such poor returns.

What adds to the fact that it was Mayo – and not some other criteria – is the fact that it mirrored 2016. Then Mayo scored 0 – 05 from 19 attempts (26% conversion rate; Ext Pts of -4.20). Mayo’s wider attacking malaise can be further illustrated by the fact that Cillian O’Connor had 10 attempts across the two games (26% of Mayo’s total) but only scored 0 – 01 (Ext Pts of -4.21). There’s no question re his fight, desire, willingness to go to the final minute but when he’s not converting Mayo will struggle as there is no one else to pick up the slack. Be that in a volume or an accuracy sense.

Galway’s defence

Can we attribute any of Mayo’s poor shooting to Galway’s defence? Surely it cannot be a coincidence that two of Mayo’s worst offensive displays – production wise – occurred against Galway?

Firstly Johnny Heaney was heroic here in blocking the two goal attempts – if either one of those go in the narrative (that dreaded word) around this game is very different. We can definitely chalk that up to the defence! Perhaps a more repeatable marker is that 13 of Mayo’s 19 (68%) point attempts were taken under strong or severe pressure. We have only just started to properly grade this pressure metric but as a reference Mayo recorded 50% & 44% “high” levels of pressure on Dublin’s point attempts in the 2016 final and replay. I’ve no doubt 66% will be on the high side come year end. Galway were excellent at pressurising the Mayo shooter.

… and yet it was not all down to Galway; Mayo missed all 6 attempts that were taken under little or no pressure ….

Galway’s shooting

Galway’s shooting from play was average; 0 – 07 from 17 attempts for a 41% Conversion Rate and an Expt Pts return of -0.30. Again given the condition this was quite good.

What was very good however was their deadball striking. In total they returned 0 – 08 from their 10 deadball attempts with Armstrong returning a very good 0 – 06 from 8 (including 3 from 3 on frees and an overall Expt Pts tally of +0.86; his excellent striking basically added 1pt above what an average day would have returned). Normally this would be a place to bash any defence that gave up 10 frees but in this instance 5 of those deadballs were 45s.
These can be attributed to player or defence on an individual basis but you are quite unlucky to give up 5 in a game where the opposition only has one shot on goal.

Kickouts

Both teams diced with death at times losing a combined 6 of their 26 short kickouts. Galway had the best ultimate return here however scoring 0 – 03 directly from these short kickouts. Mayo didn’t manage to return anything from the two Galway short ones they won.

14 (35%) of all the kickouts went past the 45 with honours being split evenly at 7 apiece. Unsurprisingly, given the high turnover rate within the game, only 3 of these 14 possessions progressed to a shot.

APPENDIX
Galway’s shot chart

Mayo’s shot chart

x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

O’Connor & Rock from frees (Rd3 of league)

March 3, 2017

From an analysis and review standpoint I am forever railing against recency bias. This “railing” comes about however because of its pervasiveness. It’s an in-built near automatic response. And of course I fell into the trap myself.

Watching the Mayo – Roscommon game last week Cillian O’Connor missed a central free about 33metres out and I had immediate flashbacks to (a) a number of missed frees in the previous round against Kerry and (b) that missed free in last year’s All Ireland final.

Was this latest missed free a sign of some cliff having been reached? Was one of Mayo’s most consistent weapons beginning to malfunction? Of course not.

oconnor-post-rd3

In the three league games to date O’Connor has hit 79% of his frees. Well above the ~72% Championship average. On Expt Pts his tally is -0.39; he has basically scored what is expected. Now the argument could be made that someone with O’Connor’s reputation should be in positive Expt Pts territory. Fine. However we must always remember that the Expt Pts tally is based off Championship returns. Frees taken in (mainly) pristine weather on (mainly) pristine surfaces. O’Connor is fine. To be slightly off in the middle of the league is acceptable? For comparison Dean Rock is running at 75% conversion rate with an Expt Pts tally of -0.86.

rock-post-rd3

What I did argue however in last year’s All Ireland review is that O’Connor had an arc outside of which he was vulnerable (the missed free in the drawn All Ireland being right on this arc). Given weather, pitch conditions etc. it is fair to expect that arc to contract at this time of year and if we placed this contracted arc over O’Connor’s frees to date then I would suggest that arguement is still relevant. He has taken 6 frees on the edges of this constricted arc and converted 3 – 50% Success Rate. He has also missed his only 45.

So in conclusion – bloody recency bias!! But O’Connor is generally fine and still remains one of the most consistent free takers once within his range.

Dublin v Mayo 2016 All Ireland Final Replay

October 5, 2016

For those new to the blog, or who haven’t been here for a while, please find a refresher on the definitions and how the numbers are compiled here

Team Possessions Attacks Shots Scores Exp Pts
Dublin 49 38 26 1 – 15 17.59
Mayo 48 36 25 1 – 14 15.62

Attack Rates, Shot Rates, Conversion Rates and points per possessions; all the main metrics were incredibly even – as to be expected in a one point game that lasted over 80 minutes – but was there anything in particular that got Dublin over the line?

Dublin shooting

Deadballs

Dublin, and thus Dean Rock, were spectacular on the day from deadballs converting 100% from eight attempts with an Expt Pts of +2.10. Connolly’s penalty was inch perfect but coming in to the year the conversion rate was 83% (24 goals from 29 shots) so the Expt Pts for a penalty is very high at 2.48. He is expected to convert that. The positive Expt Pts is almost entirely Rock’s.

He scored 0 – 07 on seven attempts with an Expt Pts of +1.58. This from the player who returned a Conversion Rate of 43% (0 – 03 from 7 shots & an Expt Pts of -1.58) in the drawn game. He was essentially removed from frees in last year’s final taking just two of the nine Dublin deadballs after converting just 40% (0 – 02 from five) in that year’s semi-final. That was a performance with an exclamation mark.

This, along with the performance against Kerry in this year’s semi-final (0 – 10 from 11 attempts & Expt Pts of +2.48), should banish any notion that he cannot deliver on the big day. More on Cillian O’Connor below but both himself and Rock are now clearly the best free takers in the country.

Goal chances

One of the more remarkable aspects of the final was the fact that Dublin did not manufacture a shot on goal from play. They did have a few breaks through the middle, such as McManamon being stripped by Harrison after the long kickout from Cluxton or Fitzsimons strolling through the centre at the death, but never got to pull the trigger.

This is the first game since 2012 that this has happened and credit is due to the collective Mayo defence. Especially how they learned the lessons from the first day with Fenton not being allowed drift in behind at any stage.

Point attempts

Dublin recorded a 44% Conversion Rate (0 – 08 from 18) and an Expt Pts tally of -1.69 when shooting from play. In and of itself this is poor but set against the returns from the drawn game (30% from 20 shots and an Expt Pts tally of -3.03) and how Mayo handled Tipperary and Tyrone (26% & -3.11 and 27% & -3.36) it was a step up.

In the drawn game it was highlighted how 50% of Dublin’s scores came from shots with no pressure applied whilst Mayo were able to apply intense pressure to 45% of their shots. Dublin only converted 22% (0 – 02 from 9 attempts) of those taken under this pressure.

Mayo managed to apply the same levels of intense pressure here (44%, 8 of 18 attempts) however Dublin’s shooting was better scoring on 50% (0 – 04) as opposed to the 22% in the drawn game. The level of pressure is illustrated b the fact that Mayo blocked three of those eigth but Dublin just squeezed more out.

That’s not to say that all their shooting was good or improved. I graded 8 shots where no pressure was applied with Dublin only scoring 0 – 03. Undoubtedly it is due to small sample size randomness but on the day those shooting under intense pressure performed better than those that had no pressure applied.

Mayo Shooting

Goal attempts

Mayo had one shot at goal and what a shot. A beautiful goal by Keegan.

A lot of ink was spent on the run up to the game on the battle between Connolly & Keegan and the impact/intensity of that battle can be viewed through the two point attempts they combined for. On Keegan’s point attempt in the 25th minute it is Connolly flying in to put him off. For Connolly’s point attempt in the 34th minute it is Keegan flying in to try – unsuccessfully – and put Connolly off.

keegan-goal-v-dublin

I bring the point attempts up above as when Keegan takes the shot at goal Connolly is not in the picture. When S O’Shea launches the ball into A O’Shea on the 45 Connolly (11) has Keegan (5) within arm’s length but doesn’t track him. By the time Keegan pulls the trigger it is Fitzsimons (22) who has put in an incredible shift from trying to block O’Shea’s kick pass to get back on Keegan’s heel.

Point attempts

Mayo converted 38% of their point attempts (0 – 05 from 13 shots) with an Expt Pts of -0.85.

Dublin managed to properly pressurise five of those 13 shots (38% – similar to Mayo’s 44% on Dublin’s shooting) which was a big step up from the Dublin defence. The last day they only managed to pressurise two, or 11%, of Mayo’s point attempts.

Mayo responded well to this pressure scoring 0 – 03 from the five shots taken under pressure. The problem came when they were placed under no, or minimal, pressure. Here they only scored 0 – 02 from 8 attempts (25% – in the draw game it was 0 – 09 from 16 attempts – 56%).As an illustration C O’Shea & Jason Doherty dropped shots into the goalkeeper’s hands from very central positions when under no pressure whilst Andy Moran pulled one wide from the left inside the 20m line.

They created the chances – the execution just wasn’t there.

Deadballs

Up until the final free kick Cillian O’Connor had been flawless converting 100% of his frees (0 – 09 from 9 attempts) with an Expt Pts of +1.34. This followed on from converting 100% of his frees (0 – 05 frees from 5 attempts) in the drawn game.

And then we had that final free. The average, from 2012 -2015, for the area of the pitch that the free was attempted from (sector6) was 64% on 650 attempts. For the same period I have O’Connor converting 75% from this sector (0 – 09 from 12 attempts). Unsurprisingly, given his overall returns, O’Connor has been – historically – above average from this range.

coc-deadballs-2016

His shot charts for frees in 2016 is above. Overall he was 77% with an Expt Pts of +1.28 and 67% in Sector 6. Below his historical averages but nothing untoward.

What is apparent from the above however is that there is an arc – in the same shape as the D but starting inside the two “x”s at the 20m line above – outside of which is accuracy becomes human! Every free taker has this arc. Basically his range. But in this instance the final free (marked in the above with a black “x”) is right on the O’Connor’s 2016 arc. He had two frees from a similar range against Galway and Westmeath converting one and missing the other.

Anyone who has read this blog for any length of time knows the esteem I hold O’Connor’s deadball ability in. He is the best around (though Rock has now joined him). There is no one else I would want taking that free but it was no “gimme”. It was right on the edge of his 2016 comfort zone.

Kickouts

Mayo won 14 of their 20 kickouts. Of those six were taken by Clarke with Mayo gaining possession on all six whist the split was 8 – 6 in Mayo’s favour when Hennelly was in goal. On its own that looks very poor for Hennelly however of Clarke’s six kickouts we only saw where five landed and of those four (80%) went short. Dublin did not pressurise the recipient on any of these four. Clarke’s kickouts were very safe.

Of Hennelly’s 14 kickouts only six, or 43% ,went short. Hennelly, whether by choice, by design or due to the Dublin press went longer than Clarke and as such placed more in harm’s way. The flip side of this is that Mayo had a net score of four points on Hennelly’s 14 kickouts (scored 1-03 and let in 0-02 directly from the possession’s gained) whereas the net benefit of winning Clarke’s six short kickouts was 0 – 01

A lot has been written about the decision to start Hennelly, and the success of kickouts is as much to do with the outfield players as it is the goalkeeper, but Hennelly was, despite the commentary, coming out on top in terms of end product on the kickouts.

Again the commentary was that Cluxton had a superb game from kickouts. He undoubtedly had some absolute peaches in the second half when he pinged two straight to Flynn & McManamon in midfield but is our view of the overall performance coloured by these just after the Mayo keeper switch?

Mayo lost six out of 20, Dublin lost five out of 21. Better but by no means outstandingly so. By the time Hennelly had lost six Cluxton had lost four. Mayo had a net gain of four points. Dublin? Broke even. Scored 0-02 from the possessions they gained on their own kickout but also conceded 0 – 02 fro he five they lost.

Again a goalkeeper’s role is not all about kickouts. Nor is the goalkeeper the sole reason for a kickout ending to a score. I may be trying to push too positive a spin on Hennelly’s performance (forget trying – I am pushing!) *but* the very negative narrative – in comparison to the very positive one on Cluxton’s – around Hennelly’s kickouts just doesn’t ring entirely true.

Appendix

For a wrap up find the stats for the two games combined below

dublin-mayo-finals-2016-combined

How anyone can categorically state that this Mayo team is “gone”, or “cannot win” the big one is beyond me. There was the width of a cigarette paper between these teams. And Dublin are considered one of the greats.

Dublin’s shot chart
dublin-shooting-v-mayo-16-replay

Mayo’s shot chart
mayo-shooting-v-dublin-16-replay
x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

Dublin v Mayo 2016 All Ireland Final

September 20, 2016

For those new to the blog, or who haven’t been here for a while, please find a refresher on the definitions and how the numbers are compiled here

Team Possessions Attacks Shots Scores Exp Pts
Dublin 57 46 31 2 – 09 17.30
Mayo 53 40 26 0 – 15 14.80

Dublin’s returns don’t look too bad – scoring 2 – 09 from an Expected return of 17.30. Those two goals however came from non shots (yes they created the chances but from an Expt Pts vantage they don’t count as they didn’t come from a Dublin shot on goal) meaning that Dublin’s actual shots returned more than 8 points below Expected and showed a Conversion Rate of 29%.

In their five games this year Dublin were showing a 61% Conversion Rate and a combined Expt Pts value of +11.21. In the 23 other Championship games since 2013 Dublin’s Conversion Rate has only dropped below 40% once – and that was a 39% against the ultra-defensive Westmeath in the 2015 Leinster final. The next lowest after that is 44%.

This was a spectacular derailing of the well-oiled machine. How did it happen?

Dublin’s shooting

Goal attempts

Dublin had three goal attempts in two different sequences (Brogan’s shot after Fenton’s original chance was saved as well as Fenton’s second attempt) which produced one goal – but the goal did not come from any of the three Dublin shots. As such the Expt Pts on the three shots was -3.42 (even though Dublin did get 3 points from the scramble – God the Expt Pts model really doesn’t like own goals!).

Note that for the second goal there was no actual goal shot – Rock spilled Connolly’s (wondrous) pass before Boyle put his foot through it.

Just on those two Fenton goal attempts – they were eerily similar with four different Mayo players committing the same basic “lack of communication” mistake.

dub-goal-chance-v-mayo-16-ai-final-actual-1st

In the first Mayo are basically set with S O’Shea (8) on Fenton (8). Fenton lays the ball off to the wrap around player and drifts towards goal however both O’Shea and Higgins (4) then go towards the player with the ball. Neither goes with Fenton.

dub-goal-chance1-v-mayo-16-ai-final

Same again for the second. This time replace McLoughlin (10) for O’Shea and Durcan (7) for Higgins. Fenton lays the ball off to the wraparound runner and continues to drift towards goal. Both Mayo players get sucked to the ball leaving Fenton acres of room in behind.

Deadballs

Unfortunately there is just no hiding from the fact that Rock had a bad day. He scored 0 – 03 from seven attempts for an Expt Pts tally of -1.57.

Much had been made of his 93% success rate this year coming in to the game (0-37 from 40 shots with an Expt pts of +7.98 from frees and 45s) however it must be remembered that he was also on 93% coming in to the 2015 semi-finals. From there on he only converted 0 – 02 from 5 attempts in the two 2015 games against Mayo and only attempted two of Dublin’s nine deadballs in the final against Kerry.

He is undoubtedly the real deal however there have to be concerns about his ability to maintain the averages at the end of the season. His excellent performance against Kerry had put some of these concerns to bed (0 -10 from 11 on frees & 45s with an Expt Pts tally of +2.48) but he’ll have to step up in the replay to silence them again

Then we have Connolly’s sideline attempt. Up until the start of this year’s Championship 18 point attempts from a sideline had been charted with a combined 28% Success Rate. Connolly is a better player than the majority, if not all, of those players who had taken those 18 attempts however (a) he is not the free taker and (b) those 18 were probably taken in better conditions and not in the 74th minute of a pulsating All Ireland final. It was a punt but he was always more likely to give the ball to Mayo having missed than having scored.

Point attempts

That leaves 20 point attempts throughout the game which saw Dublin convert 30% (0 – 06) with an Expt Pts tally of -3.03. Granted the conditions were not great but that is just very, very poor. And it was not confined to a handful of individuals having a day off – 12 separate Dublin players had a point attempt. There was just no sign of this.

In reviewing the SF against Tipperary we noted that the Mayo defence had restricted Tyrone to 27% and an Expt Pt return of -3.36 whilst holding the previously free scoring Tipperary to 26% and -3.11. We now add Dublin’s 30% and -3.03 to that tally. They are obviously doing something right. Against Tipperary & Tyrone they applied pressure to 66% of their point attempts when the norm is somewhere around the 51% mark. Again here they pressurised – to one extent or another – 75% of Dublin’s shots. But that doesn’t fully tell the story. In an attempt to somewhat measure what they were doing I graded all pressure on the shooter from 0 (no pressure applied) to 3 (intense pressure)

pressure-index

As can be seen Mayo were very good at applying intense pressure to 45% of Dublin’s point attempts. We don’t have any other comparison point for this but Dublin only applied a similar amount of pressure to 11% of Mayo’s shots.

It is no fluke that Dublin struggled – but it is strange that they struggled so much.

Note Colm Boyle shows up really well in this context. I have him charted as applying pressure to four separate shots with three of the being strong pressure (one “2” in the above table and two “3”s)

Mayo shooting

Goal attempts

Mayo had two clear cut goal attempts coming away with 0-01. The first fell very early to Durcan who had his shot blocked by Cooper. Hindsight is 20:20 and all that but looking at the position just as he was about to strike you would love to have seen him ship it left where they had an overlap with two of their best finishers standing on the square
mayo-goal-chance1-v-dub-16-ai-final
The second one was Moran’s attempt on the 52nd minute
mayo-goal-chance2-v-dub-16-ai-final
There was a split second where O’Connor was free on the square and when I put the still up on Twitter there was a split opinion on whether the ball needed to be fisted across. Personally the picture makes a fisted pass look a lot easier than real time did – it would have to have been spot on – and I would want Moran having the confidence to take that shot on.

Point attempts

Mayo were slightly above average with a Conversion Rate of 50% (0-09 from 18 shots) and an Expt Pts of +1.07.
Much like Dublin there was a large spread of shooters with ten different players having a shot. O’Connor & Vaughan showed well here scoring 0 – 02 from three attempts each but the overall spread means that no one really stood out.

Again like Dublin however there were some wild efforts in there – not sure either O’Shea should be taking pot shots outside the 45!

Deadballs

Immediately after the game concluded the thought had been that O’Connor’s deadball day had been spectacular. That however was more in comparison to Rock than anything else. O’Connor converted 86% (0 – 05 from 6 shots) with an Expt Pts was +0.41. A good day’s return on the numbers; nothing more.

However when looking at that stat line we need to take into account the context of the game. If Rock has question marks about him on the big day then O’Connor is the exact opposite – he thrives on it.

In eight All Ireland finals and semi-finals since 2013 O’Connor is 81% on frees and 45s (0 – 09 from 48 attempts) with an Expt Pts tally of +2.44. When everything is to play for O’Connor delivers well above average.

Kickouts

Dublin won 18 of their 22 but only managed 0-01, or 0.06 points per kickout won, from those 18 wins. In the 2016 Championship to date that was 0.51 points per kickout won. Another one to chalk down for the Mayo defence.

Another minor victory can be noted in the time it took Cluxton to get his kicks off. A lot had been made in the build up to the match as to how Cluxton looked to get his kickouts taken within six seconds. We didn’t see a number of the kickouts but when we did Cluxton was regularly taking over 15 seconds to kick the ball out (the first few were indicative; – stalled as had to be retaken, 15 second wait, 16 seconds, didn’t see on TV coverage, 12 seconds, 14 seconds, delayed for the black card, 20 seconds).

Mayo were, score wise, better racking up 0 – 04 on the 16 kickouts they won – 0.25 points per kickout – however they also coughed up 0 – 02 and nearly had a calamitous last few minutes when Clarke hit three poor kickouts in quick succession. The first was lofted to Parsons on the 45m line on the right wing allowing Mannion to break the ball to O’Gara forcing Barrett to give away a free that Rock pointed. On the resultant kickout Clarke managed to pick out Connolly short left who took one look and pointed. Clarke then placed Higgins under all sorts of trouble when he went short right.

Up until those three kickouts Mayo had taken 17 winning 14 – however when they went past the 45 they had lost three out of four. Given this, and the sequence above, it will be interesting to see if Dublin push up the next day putting Clarke under pressure and forcing him to go longer.

Appendix

Dublin’s shot chart
dublin-shooting-v-mayo-16

Mayo’s shot chart
mayo-shooting-v-dublin-16
x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

Mayo v Tipperary 2016 AI Semi Final

August 23, 2016

For those new to the blog, or who haven’t been here for a while, please find a refresher on the definitions and how the numbers are compiled here

Team Possessions Attacks Shots Scores Exp Pts
Mayo 57 41 33 2 – 13 21.34
Tipperary 52 39 29 0 – 14 16.36

Goals. They win games and set the tone for how a game unfolds. Mayo had three attempts scoring 2-00 whilst Tipperary, chasing the game for much of the afternoon and after carving out 13 goal chances combined (scoring 4-02) against Derry & Galway, didn’t have one attempt.

Tipperary shooting

First up the positive. Tipperary’s deadball accuracy was excellent hitting 0 – 09 from ten attempts and nine on the trot – especially when they needed them – after O’Halloran missed their first one from outside the 45. The Expt Pts for these ten attempts was 8.25 giving a return of +0.75. With a conversion rate of 90% an Expt Pts of +0.75 does not appear overly generous however this, as the chart below shows, is an indicator that the frees were of the easier variety and also ties in to the fact that they didn’t have any goal attempts.

Mayo were on notice and were not going to let them through.

Tipp deadballs

An overall Expt pts of -2.36 incorporating no goal shots and good accuracy on frees leads to some very poor shooting from play. Tipperary were just 26% (5 from 19) on point attempts from play with an Expt Pts tally of -3.11. These weren’t some collection of long range “shoot and hope” efforts either as only two came from outside the 45.

Tipp from play

As the chart above shows there were some very poor efforts contributing to that 26%. Tipperary had nine efforts from the most central zones but only scored 0 – 03 (Expt Pts -1.73). From wider angles they were 0 – 02 from eight (Expt Pts -0.62)

This is the second consecutive game whereby a team has underperformed when shooting from play against Mayo (Tyrone were 27% on 22 shots with an Expt Pts of -3.36). At some stage we are going to have to give the Mayo defence some credit for these poor returns!

Looking at Tyrone & Tipperary’s 41 shots from play Mayo applied pressure to 66% of them. We don’t use pressure in the numbers but for the last four years 51% of all shots tracked were recorded as being taken under pressure. Accepting that everyone’s definition of pressure will be different we can say that Mayo’s defence has applied pressure at a greater level than is the norm – and their opponents shooting has suffered, at least in part, as a consequence.

Mayo shooting

Mayo’s overall shooting was as poor as Tipperary’s with a total Ext Pts of -2.34. But whereas Tipperary were consistent in their issues throughout the game Mayo were gloriously inconsistent.

Expt Pts

Up until the goal in the 25th minute Mayo were a very poor 25% (3 from 12) with an Expt Pts of -3.84. From play it reads even worse with a paltry 0-01 registered from 8 attempts (13%) including a glorious missed fisted point attempt from the 20m line. And then the goal happened.

From the 25th minute until the end of the first half Mayo were a mirror image scoring 1-07 from just eight shots (Expt Pt of +4.70). Within that span they only had one possession that did not end in a score. A point per possession return of 0.40 is generally very good; Mayo returned a barely believable 1.11 points for those nine possessions. It was a stunning “power play”

And then half time happened. D O’Connor responded to Quinlivan’s free early with a trademark strike from the right in the 37th minute and then …. nothing. Radio silence. Mayo managed just two shots – let alone garner any scores – in the next 17 minutes. As brilliant as they had been prior to half time they were inept here. From their 1.11 points per possession – on 9 possessions – prior to half time they now went 11 possessions without scoring. Not only that they managed just five attacks and two shots in that period.

Mayo completely ceded the game to Tipperary who, in that same time period, garnered 17 possessions scoring 0 – 04 from 10 shots. If Mayo allow such a fallow spot in the final you have to imagine that either Dublin or Kerry would punish them at a higher rate than Tipperary did (0.24 pts per possession on those 17 possessions).

The goal

The build up to the second goal was very fortuitous but there was nothing lucky about the first.

Mayo goal v Tipp

Although the move for the goal emanated from a misplaced hand pass involving one of the Tipperary defenders bringing the ball out they were still well set when Higgins approached the 45. They were manned up 4 on 4 (Campbell (3) has McLoughlin (10) on his shoulder just out of picture) with an extra trailing defender (18). It is a testament to Higgins’ speed and close ball control that he was not just able to round Fox (12) but also that the covering defence couldn’t get across to him. By bursting through the defence at speed either Campbell (3) or Feehan (7) had to leave their man and stop the shot.

Appendix

Mayo’s shooting
Mayo shooting (V Tipperary 16)
x = missed, disc = score, yellow = deadball, black = 1st half from play, white = 2nd half, red = goal attempt

 

Players with >= 4 shots from play

Shots Scores Success Rate Exp Pts
M Quinlivan (Tipperary) 8 0 – 07 88% 6.23
C O’Connor (Mayo) 7 0 – 03 57% 4.66
D O’Connor (Mayo) 6 0 – 02 33% 2.97
A Moran (Mayo) 5 0 – 04 80% 3.50
P Austin (Tipperary) 5 0 – 01 20% 2.33
C Sweeney (Tipperary) 4 0 – 03 75% 2.15
K O’Halloran (Tipperary) 4 0 – 02 50% 2.07