Glen v Errigal Ciaran 2022 Ulster Club QF

A brilliant game with numerous talking points. From a pure numbers perspective Glen had 23 shots producing 13 scores and 0.44 points per possession (ppp). Errigal Ciaran had 22 shots producing 13 scores and 0.41 ppp. Those numbers do not, generally, lead to a four-point win unless one of the oldest maxims in the game comes to the forefront – goals win games.

Glen had four attempts on goal scoring 2 – 01 whilst also converting two (poor?) dropping shots into 1 – 01. Errigal Ciaran had two shots at goal scoring one and hammering the crossbar with the other. To rub salt into the goal attempt wound the follow up scramble, after the ball hit the crossbar, saw a palmed goal ruled out for a square ball.

There were two main areas where the teams differed – kickouts and the spread of shooters.

Kickouts

Glen won the kickout possession battle 24 – 15. When the ball travelled past the 45 (“mid” and “long” combined) they won the possession battle 14 – 10. Included in this were four of five Errigal kickouts in their dominant 10 minutes just after half time.

Winning the Errigal kickout was huge for Glen. All eight won outside Errigal’s 45 (“mid”/ ”long”) were turned into a shot with six of the eight being quick strikes where only four players controlled the ball prior to the shot. Win and punish.

Errigal not pushing up hard on the Glen kickout worked out. Unlike when they won an Errigal kickout Glen only progressed five of their own nine short ones to an attack (controlling the ball inside Errigal’s 45) with just the two shots.

Looking forward I thought that this might be a form of weakness. Glen had 23 possessions starting inside their own 45 (own short kickouts and turnovers picked up inside the 45) producing eight shots. A shot every 2.33 possessions. Elsewhere they got a shot off every 1.42 possessions. Did they struggle to create shots against set defences?

Not really. In their Ulster QF & SF vs Scotstown & Kilcoo in the 2021 campaign they produced a shot every 1.86 possessions (starting inside the 45) and 1.35 elsewhere. The 2022 average to date is a shot every 2.07 possessions for balls collected inside your own 45 and 1.58 for everything else. 

This was just variance.

Spread of shooters

Glen had ten different players attempt a shot with no one attempting more than four. They also had an impact off the bench with their two main subs (McGonigle came on for just two minutes at the death) getting 0 – 02 from three shots in a combined 50 minutes on the pitch

Errigal Ciaran, on the other hand, just had the five players attempt a shot with the three Canavans combining for 18 shots and 1 – 09. Their three main subs had a combined 55 minutes on the pitch producing just the one primary assist.

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All Ireland club final (Kilcoo v Kilmacud) Preview

Keys to the game

• Can Kilcoo break down that Kilmacud defence? Conversely can Kilmacud stay in their shape for ~65minutes and not fall victim to a late goal?
• If forced out how efficient can Kilcoo be on higher variance shooting?
• Can Kilmacud continue to get a higher percentage of their shots off from the central channel?
• Kickouts; will Kilmacud press and if they do will Kilcoo continue to force them in? What do Kilmacud do? A Kilcoo hammer blow awaits on anything that drops short of the 65.
• And finally, the referee. Kilcoo had 17 shots from frees in their three games. But gave up 20. If this turns into a tight possession driven game – with both teams prodding for an opening – how the players shape the referees view of their tackling could be the decider

When Kilcoo have the ball

Kilcoo are very (very) patient with the ball. Of their 118 possessions in the three games under review (v Glen and Derrygonnelly in the Ulster campaign and St. Finbarrs in the semi-final) they strung ten or more passes together on 46% of them. All other club teams in this year’s review (13 non Kilcoo games – 26 different team performances) combined for 23%.

Their patience is not to be mistaken for passivity. They continuously probe with 25% of all their individual possessions being inside the opposition’s 45 and about a quarter of all possessions involving multiple entries into the 45 … they gain possession, bring it up to the 45 and start to probe right using Shealin Johnston’s speed to cut in to goal, down the middle primarily with Daryl Branagan or on the left with Eugene Branagan or Ceilum Doherty. If it is a quick break from a turnover Ryan Johnston picks up the ball on the 65 and runs at speed at you. They prod and thrust looking for the weak shoulder to attack or the cut in towards goal. If it does not come, they are happy to recycle back out to the 45 and go again. And again.

It must be absolutely draining to defend against. And this is shown up somewhat in two ways. The first is the volume of shots from frees they have attained with 17 across the three games – Kilmacud, in their three games under review, have only had eight.

Secondly, they have manufactured ten attempts at goal but only two of the ten have come before the 40^th minute. The constant prodding and poking eventually leads to defences opening up. And that opening up, alloyed to Kilcoo’s willingness to go over and back, leads to the attempts landing at various players’ feet … eight different players have attempted those ten shots at goal. And they have been clinical with those attempts scoring 5-03.

Does the approach help their attack? Given their patience, and probing, their scoring efficiency is aided by where they shoot from rather than by excellent shooting. There is nothing wild. Nothing from more than ~35m out.

But is it predictable? By being so patient, and not shooting from the 45, they let teams set their defensive block deep on top of the D. Kilcoo have not gotten shots off in the pocket straight in front of goal (red above) … instead it is in an arc around the D (blue above). There is no real lean to either side; on the attacking left they are 45% (0 – 09 from 20) whilst on the right they are better (0 – 11 from 18) but that is probably due to more shots being closer to centre.

Deadball efficiency is as expected – probably a touch below average just given the propensity to miss those on the D

The template is simple enough. Control the ball. Control the game. Pull teams back and forth until there is a gap then pull the trigger in closer to goal or force the opposition to foul. As teams tire, they may not be able to close those gaps, or keep up to foul. Go for the jugular.

But that is just one side of the coin. How have the Kilmacud defence performed with these points in mind?

They have allowed six attempts at goal with four of those coming from St. Judes. In their last two games Padraig Pearses did not get an attempt off whilst Naas had two – both taken under severe pressure with the second coming late in the game (58^th minute). Kilmacud have been particularly good at protecting that goal of late.

That is also shown up in the combined shot chart for Pearses & Naas … look how clean that area (known as the McGowan/O’Carroll zone) directly in front of goal is.

That is what every defence in the country wants their chart to look like. They do give up those shots around the D but that is high variance stuff – if they keep Kilcoo shooting from out there they will be more than happy.

One further point on the possession is where it emanates from. Kilcoo have gone short on 31 of their 38 kickouts. They want primary possession and are willing to fit the ball in to get it … only six of those 31 short kickouts were received uncontested or under no pressure. 11 were received under pressure, or with a man draped over the receiver, whilst another 14 were received whilst the opposition were pressing. And none were lost.

They have been clinical on the opposition’s kickout. They have faced 48 and won ten … getting their hands on one in five. But of the ten they won they produced nine shots scoring 2-04.

When Kilmacud Crokes have the ball

Kilmacud can be patient on the ball as well. Within the three games under review (v St Judes in the Dublin final, Naas in Leinster & Padraig Pearses in the semi-final) the percentage of possessions with ten or more passes came in at 32%. Not as high a proportion as Kilcoo but still higher than the average.

Their shooting is much the same as Kilcoo’s, but they are more willing to shoot from further out with that pocket at the top of the D being quite productive.

The above chart includes the St. Judes game when Paul Mannion was in the team. Despite being 13 he did not necessarily shoot from the offensive right that game … and his absence against Naas & Pearses hasn’t led to any huge pattern in their shooting. They were very balanced in those two non-Mannion games with seven point attempts from the right and seven from the left

Kilmacud have only (when compared to Kilcoo), attempted eight shots from frees across the three games and ten deadballs in total. Their returns have been a tad below average as Ferris has missed two 45s and a straight on free so it cannot be considered a strength.

But if Kilcoo continue to foul at the rate they have to date (eight against Glen in normal time; similarly nine to St. Finbarrs) then average may be good enough as the volume will aid their returns.

One major point of differential between the teams is the kickouts. Kilcoo went short 82% of the time (31 of 38). Kilmacud only went short on 33% (11 of 34) of theirs.

Part of the reason is that they are not as set to go short as Kilcoo are … they have lost three of those 11 which is a huge amount. And on top of that they have lost six of the 11 that have landed between the 45 and 65.

22 kickouts short of the 65 which should be prime retention ball – yet they’ve lost eight. And to date Ferris has not shown a propensity to be able to outkick any press. He can get them to the land between the 65s but not beyond.

Kilcoo are deadly when they get their hands on the opposition kickouts. Kilmacud have really struggled getting primary possession from their kickouts. How Kilmacud navigate this (or indeed what traps Kilcoo set them) will go a long way to determine the game.

2021 Galway Senior Club final

Corofin’s attacking output, over the ~65 minutes, was very, very poor. Unless you have complete control of the ball – which is a very rare occurrence – 0.24 points per possession (ppp) will not win any game. (I have completed four county finals from 2021 – the winning team’s ppp were 0.41, 0.34, 0.44 and 0.38 here)

But even that lens is flattering. When Mountbellew scored their goal in the 35^th minute, to go 1 – 09 to 0 – 03 up, Corofin had just 18 possessions (I say “just” as Mountbellew had 25) but produced a meagre four (four!) shots. Had they maintained that trajectory for the whole game it would end up as 0.16 ppp and a Shot Rate of 22%! It was the 8^th minute before Corofin completed a kick pass (and even then it didn’t go to hand – Mountbellew fouled the receiver) and by the first water break they had only controlled the ball inside Mountbellew’s 45 twice.

The flip side of this is that Mountbellew not only hit the ground running but hit *everything* in that opening period. It reads as Val Daly’s dream game plan; stymie Corofin’s early attacking moves, get your hands on the ball, read Power’s kickouts pinning Corofin in and finally take your chances. Taking each in turn

Corofin’s first three team possessions;

• own kickout won as a Mark but subsequent pass, from Canney into Farragher intercepted in the D
• own kickout won by Wall who carried it into Mountbellew’s 45 where he was dispossessed
• sideline ball intercepted inside own 45. Corofin fouled the ball on the way out

Hands on the ball. Mountbellew are not an immature team, nor are they full of young bucks, however they have struggled in finals. They beat Corofin in the 2020 semi-finals but there must still have been some apprehension. Whether deliberate or not they eased themselves into the game. Corofin’s two first possessions ended after one player touched the ball. Mountbellew’s first two possessions had two of their longest strings of passing. In these two opening possessions there were 33 individual player possessions. Now there will be some players with multiple touches therein however that is a lot of the team getting their hands on the ball early.

Reading Power’s kickouts

Following on from the above Corofin won three of their first four kickouts (circled red). Power was angling the kicks to pockets on the wings for runners to run on to. One of these produced Corofin’s only shot in the first quarter. But Mountbellew quickly got to grips with this and won the next four (circled yellow) and, just as important as winning the kickout, they managed to get 0 – 02 from those four kickouts.

Which brings us to Mountbellew’s shooting early doors. At that goal on the 35^th minute they had taken 16 shots and scored 1 – 09. A conversion rate of 63%. But prior to that they had a phenomenal start, scoring 0 – 07 from nine shots (78% Conversion Rate). These nine shots were not easy either with only one of the seven from play coming from “inside”.

They were 0 – 04 from six “outside” with McHugh converting a tight enough angled free kick. This was unsustainable however the early lead, and then the goal, cracked open the game and took the sting, and urgency, out of everything thereafter.

Ballyboden St. Endas v Kilcoo 2019 All Ireland Club Final

A high level overview shows an incredibly close game that, on chances alone, Ballyboden edged. They had 21 shots, with an Expected return of 0 – 14; Kilcoo produced 20 shots expected to return 1 – 10. They were created off very similar Attack Rates (78% apiece), Shot Rates (68% v 69%) and Conversion Rates (52% v 50%).

And yet Ballyboden were scrambling at the end trying to claw back a five point deficit with ten minutes to go. How did Ballyboden return a similar Conversion Rate to that of Kilcoo, off roughly the same number of shots, but find themselves in that hole? In large part due to their shot type.

Ballyboden shooting

Disc = score, X= miss; yellow = deadball, red = attempt on goal, black = point attempt from play 1st half, black = 2nd half

13 (10x frees and 3x 45s) of Ballyboden’s 21 shots were deadballs. That accounts for 62% of all their attempts which is an incredibly high volume; both in absolute terms and as a percentage of a teams’ total shot count. In the four provincial finals the next highest was seven shots from deadballs for Padraig Pearses in the Connacht final which accounted for 41% of all their shots.

Given this high volume Ballyboden had to ensure accuracy on their deadballs to keep the scoreboard ticking over. Instead they were poor scoring just 0 – 07 (54%; Expt Pts of -2.43).

Looking at the shot chart calling that 54% poor would seem harsh as they scored 0 – 07 from the nine attempts closer to goal and missed the four “50:50” chances from around the 45. But if these were true “50:50” chances then the average for the four would have been 0 – 02. To not get any of them is very poor especially as all four were taken with the benefit of a noticeable wind.

That brings up another quirk in the Ballyboden game – their lack of long range shooting. With that wind in the second half the furthest they attempted a shot from was c25 metres. In the first half they only had one shot (from play) from outside the 20m line. They were very conservative in their shooting.

Compare that to Kilcoo

Kilcoo shooting

With the wind in the first half Kilcoo had ten shots with nine of them coming from “outside”. The tenth was Johnston’s goal which was worked off a turnover high up the pitch.

Kilcoo only managed to score 0 – 02 from those nine point attempts so it was not necessarily a very accurate ploy (22% Conversion Rate; Expt pts -1.76) but it is in stark contrast to how Ballyboden used the wind. The old Wayne Gretzky adage of “You miss 100% of the shots you don’t take” comes to mind.

Of course, the other difference with Kilcoo’s shooting was their goal attempts. Kilcoo created three scoring 2 – 00. Ballyboden only had the one shot at goal which was a tight angled attempt that ensued from a scramble deep into injury time.

Kilcoo were very good in this aspect in the Ulster final as well meaning that they have scored 4 – 01 from just seven attempts on goal in two games. This is well above what would be expected. Can they maintain this in the final? Generally, you would expect their returns on goal attempts to revert to the mean but that’s in a long run of games. Nothing is set for just one game.

Kickouts

Possession from kickouts was a wash. Both teams lost one short kickout whilst the possession was evenly split on those that landed past the 45 (Kilcoo won possession on 11 to Ballyboden’s 10). No great split by keeper either; Kilcoo won six of Ballyboden’s 13 kickouts past the 45 with Ballyboden winning four of Kilcoo’s eight

One slightly strange aberration was that Kilcoo didn’t manage a shot from any of the five Ballyboden kickouts they won. This wasn’t an apparent issue in the Ulster final against Naomh Conaill, when they scored
0 – 02, off two shots, from four Naomh Conaill kickouts. But one of those shots came from a short one that went wrong. Over their last two games that is seven opposition kickouts past the 45 they have claimed – but only produced one shot from same. If they get a toe hold in the final through Corofin’s kickout they’ll have to do more.

Ballyboden St. Endas v Éire Óg 2019 Leinster Club Final

When reviewing games here we rarely reference the weather (except for last year’s Ulster club final) – mainly because the games covered are intercounty Championship played in the best of weather on (mainly) perfectly maintained pitches. This wasn’t the case here. There was a very strong wind down the pitch, the rain came and went throughout the game leading to a greasy ball and the ground was dead and heavy. All of which led to difficult handling conditions, placing numerous players under huge pressure, as well as changing the normal shooting zones.

A quick visual on how the conditions affected the game – below are the shots from play with the wind (white) and without (black).

Against the wind the furthest score was c25m from the goals. Only one shot was from further than 30m out. This in turn compresses the area that needs to be defended and can lead to more turnovers if the attacking team don’t stand off stringing a series of non-threatening passes together.

With all that said above are the numbers. There were only 31 shots in the game (the Munster final had 45, Ulster 37 and Connacht 36) with a total of 60 turnovers (Munster x43, Ulster x33 and Connacht x34) and 88 possessions (Munster x81, Ulster x69 and Connacht x68). The usual metrics of Shot Rate, Attack Rate and points per possession really don’t stack up.

That’s not to say the high turnover volume was purely down to the conditions. There were 24 turnovers higher up the pitch outside each teams’ respective 45 which is indicative of excellent tackling and physical aggression without cynicism. That lack of cynicism is further evidenced by the fact that there were just five shots at goal from frees throughout the whole game.

When Ballyboden had the ball

Ballyboden may not have taken many shots but they handled the conditions, shooting wise, better than Éire Óg did; they were 70% (0 – 07 from 10) on point attempts from play as against 43% (0 – 06 from 14) for Éire Óg. They also managed to eke out the only shot on goal.

Conal Keaney was evergreen scoring on all three attempts and also setting up another shot.

When Éire Óg had the ball

Éire Óg struggled to use the wind in the first half. They had a purple patch around the 10th minute when they scored 0 – 03 from three in sixty seconds. But outside that they didn’t have another shot in the first 20 minutes and then finished the half with nothing from four attempts.

The accuracy didn’t improve against the wind in the second half scoring another 0 – 03 from seven shots from play whilst another two opportunities went abegging with forced free kicks.
Séan Gannon was immense scoring 0 – 02 from 3 as well as providing the primary assists for another four shots.

Kickouts

Just a quick note on Éire Óg’s kickouts.

black = 1st half, white = 2nd half

They had just the four kickouts in the first half and, with the wind, went long(ish) on all of them winning possession on three. Against Portlaoise their mid to long kickouts broke 50:50 (won five, lost five). All good.

Against the wind they had seven kickouts but lost five; including two of the last three that led to Ballyboden points at the death. Could they have changed up those last few? Should they have? Not once did they go short. Ballyboden did so on three of their six against the wind. In the semi-final Éire Óg went short six times so it was in their locker. But having said that they did win a long one immediately after going a point behind but then kicked the ball away. Who is to say the outcome would be any different if they did go short? And there was a subtle change; their first four against the wind went mid to right and after losing three they went mid left with the last three. It just didn’t work.

Kilcoo v Naomh Conaill 2019 Ulster Club Final

Kilcoo on the ball

Kilcoo’s start, up until the second goal which put them six points clear, was as clinical a display as you will find.

That is an 86%** Conversion Rate (2 – 10 from 14 shots – above) with 0.82 points per possessions. Everything was working; Conor Laverty was immense leading the line being directly involved in seven of those 14 shots. Darryl Branagan had scored 1 – 01 and was involved in the build up to the other goal. Everything was working; they scored immediately off a turnover inside Naomh Conaill’s 45, off a Naomh Conaill short
kickout that went awry as well as getting shots off after stringing 28 & 30 passes together.

**Technically it is 79% as Eugene Branagan’s point in the 12th minute was pushed over by McGrath

And then it wasn’t. From the Branagan goal in the 38th minute to his relieving point in the 59th Kilcoo only managed one shot. And that was again from Branagan. Indeed, from that second goal Kilcoo only managed three shots in total with Darryl Branagan taking two. The other was the breakaway in injury time where Ward tried to lob the keeper from 40 metres. No midfielder or forward had a point attempt for the guts of 30 minutes

The visual impression from the TV pictures (always the worst methodology from which to draw sweeping statements!) was that they went into their shell in that 20 minute period between the Branagan scores. Do the numbers support that?

Post the second goal they lost the possession count 12 – 8 after winning that particular battle 22-19 up to that point. Part of this reversal was the fact that Naomh Conaill got their hands on two of Kilcoo’s seven kickouts whilst Naomh Conaill held onto their only two. Nothing untoward there – except for what that means on turnovers. Kilcoo were 5 – 4 ahead on kickouts but 3 – 8 behind on turnovers. In 30 minutes, from the 10th minute to the 2nd goal, Kilcoo gave up a measly three turnovers. Then they gave up eight in 20 minutes.

Now part of all this is undoubtedly regression to the mean. No club team can keep the numbers Kilcoo were producing going. Part was undoubtedly Naomh Conaill stepping up. Desperation at going six behind propelled them forward. Given their travails in Donegal finals over the past few years they are far from meek lambs.

But part is also a change in how Kilcoo played and used the ball. Again, anecdotally Laverty seemed to be on the ball around the 45 and 65 a lot more in the closing 15 minutes. They also used the ball differently. The proportion of individual possessions inside and outside the 45 changed. It was roughly 3.8:1 (213 individual possessions outside the 45 to 56 inside) in the dominant period up until their 2nd goal. But thereafter it was 5:1; 100 possessions outside the 45 to 20 inside. They slowed up the delivery, invited Naomh Conaill on, and turned it over with less of a focal point up top.

Naomh Conaill on the ball

Naomh Conaill’s method of attack was very different to Kilcoo’s. Whereas Kilcoo were using Laverty at the head of the attack, alongside some hard running from Darryl Branagan and the Johnstons, Naomh Conaill much preferred the high ball into the full forward. Whilst an undoubted tactic and given the trend towards ball retention in recent years one, especially at club level, that defences are not used to dealing with, it is also quite volatile. How often does a high ball in result in a clean catch? In a goal? In a score from a flick on or a subsequent scramble?

The type of attack is not something I have tracked. Not because it is unimportant but mainly because we are viewing games on TV from one main camera angle. What happens pre the ball coming in (no. of forwards v defenders, the runs being made, has the full forward boxed out the full back etc.) is very hard to determine. So, the numbers here stand on their own without any context of what we would expect to happen.

Naomh Conaill launched ten high balls, on nine separate possession, into the square. Some were better than others but in the main they were on point into the square. Of those ten they manufactured four shots and scored 0 – 02 though the Expt Pts on those four shots was +3.14.

We know that “good” attacks will return 0.35 – 0.40 points per possession (ppp). On their high balls Naomh Conaill returned 0.20ppp but this was in part down to poor execution. They should have returned 0.31ppp which isn’t far off the average. That Expt Pts is very high for just four shots – and is part of the thought process behind using the high ball. You’ll get less shots but the ones you do get should be (will be?) much easier.

On the 26 possessions where they didn’t launch a high ball, they had 16 shots (a shot 62% of the time vs 40% on the high balls) scoring 2 – 07 or 0.50 ppp. The Expt Pts on these 16 shots was +9.98 or 0.38ppp
A muddled enough picture. Naomh Conaill definitely got more (much more) on those possessions they didn’t launch in. But a large part of that was from excellent shooting (+3.02 on Expt Pts on non-high balls v -1.14 on the high balls). When we look at the Expt Pts for both the gap is much narrower (0.31ppp for high balls vs 0.38ppp for non-high balls).

And this is where the volatility comes in. Naomh Conaill got less shots but one of them was a goal attempt from the edge of the small square which was blasted over. You get the sense that to make the constant frequent high ball tactic work you need a goal.

Portlaoise v Éire Óg 2019 Leinster Club SF

Portlaoise really struggled offensively in the second half. They only managed seven shots, five from play, and whilst many will look to attribute this to (a) having a man sent off and (b) then chasing a goal this somewhat conceals how they were going. Up until Lillis’ red card the shot count in the second half was 8 – 4 in Éire Óg’s favour whilst they were 0 – 05 to 0 – 01 ahead on the scoreboard.

It is hard, from a purely numeric perspective, to know how much opprobrium to heap on an attack when there is a poor offensive display or, conversely, how much praise should be heaped on the defending team. But from Éire Óg’s perspective there are some things we can elicit. Like their discipline; both in terms of shape and tackling.

Up until the red card Portlaoise had 33 possessions. Of those 15 had at least a double digit volume of passes yet in these 15 possessions Éire Óg only gave away one shot from free, didn’t cough up a goal chance and only allowed 0 – 01 from nine point attempts. Portlaoise couldn’t break them down, got frustrated by Éire Óg’s shape and tenacity, and started taking poor options (0 – 02 from 12 “outside” below)

Éire Óg did what was required up front. Missed a penalty but converted their other two goal chances. Recovered from some shaky frees in the first half to score 0 – 04 from six. 41% (0 – 07 from 17) on point attempts.

Despite scoring 2 – 11, which is an excellent score at this time of year, this was achieved through volume rather than accuracy. Their attacking play complemented their excellent defensive play rather than trumping it.

Therein Darragh O’Brien was quietly excellent. He may not have shown up on the scoreboard (0 – 01 compared to Chris Blake’s 1 – 04 for example), but was exemplary in the No.11 position with a very impressive eight primary assists.

Kickouts

This was in interesting battle throughout the game. Above is Portlaoise’s kickout chart. They were able to get them away into the left full/half back pocket relatively easily. One went out over the sideline but nothing much came of it. This is Brody’s natural pocket (when he opened his body and went to his right Blake caught it short of the 45 and scored a point) and was more or less given to Portlaoise. But they were then not able to use it.

Portlaoise got their hands on 14 short kickouts. All bar one were roll outs into the D or into that pocket. Portlaoise were only able to progress four to a shot. The possession on five didn’t make the Éire Óg 45 whilst another four saw just one player control the ball inside that 45. Éire Óg just suffocated them as they progressed up the pitch.

On the flip side Éire Óg really struggled on their kickout in the first half.

An over simplification for sure but they had two kickouts in that half; long mid-right into a contest on the 65 and onto the 45 by the sideline to the keeper’s left. 7 of their 10 first half kickouts went into these two areas with Portlaoise getting their hands on five.

Truth be told Portlaoise didn’t produce enough to put the Éire Óg keeper under pressure in the second half but when he was called upon (even before the Lillis red card reduced Portlaoise’s options) he changed it up avoiding the two first half pockets and dropping the ball into an area between the 45 & 65 to his left. They won 3 of 4 here and also picked up two short ones. Portlaoise were never able to put them under the sort of intense pressure that produced in the first half where they won four out of five Éire Óg kickouts racking up 1 – 02

Corofin v Padraig Pearses 2019 Connacht Club Final

Nothing spectacular from Corofin. 1 – 00 from their two attempts at goal; 0 – 03 from four frees and 0 – 07 from 13 on point attempts. Expected to score 13 points. Scored 1 – 10. All in all, an average enough outing.

I imagine Pearses will be annoyed with their days work. They missed two relatively straight forward central frees which were somewhat cancelled out by a converted 45. But that 45 aside they skied a very good one on one goal chance and converted just 0 – 03 from 8 point attempts.

Those numbers don’t take into account their very slow start. It was the 12th minute before they controlled the ball inside Corofin’s 45 with a Niall Daly point attempt. It was the 19th minute before a Pearses player completed a pass from within the 45 by which time they had only controlled the ball twice inside the 45 (alongside Daly’s shot Carey attempted a free out on the sideline after getting fouled).
And yet for all that after 40 minutes it was 0 – 06 apiece and Pearses were 13-12 ahead on the shot count.

Reading way too much into it Corofin let Pearses hang around despite their terrible (metric wise) start but once Pearses drew level they upped it a gear, scored 1 – 02 in five minutes, allowing Pearses just one possession in that time, and then saw out the game.

Corofin shooting

Corofin were their clinical selves “inside” scoring 1 – 07 from just nine shots with the missed attempt being a contested fisted goal attempt from a dropping diagonal ball.

Disc = score, X = miss; red = goal attempt, yellow = deadball, black = point attempt from play 1st half, white = point attempt from play 2nd half

The flip side is that their “outside” shooting was quite poor; 0 – 02 from 8 from play.

This may just be a blip – not only in terms of Conversion Rate but also volume. They were 0 – 03 from just five attempts “outside” against BallintubberBallintubberBallintubber and in their devastating 1st halves against Dr Crokes and Gaoth Dobhair (below), at the end of last year’s campaign, attempted just 5 of 26 shots from “outside”

When it matters, they don’t do “outside” shooting.

Corofin’s range of attacking players was again on display here. From their 15 shots from play they had 11 different shooters. Padraig Pearses had five (and only one was not named Daly!).
Ian Burke’s quick hands were on full display again – giving the pass inside for Liam Silke’s goal and also providing the primary assist on four other point attempts.

Kickouts

Nothing much there to be honest. But we now have two Corofin games where we can overlay their kickouts.

30 kickouts in the two games with Corofin winning possession on 77% (23 of 30). One third (10) have gone short (which is below intercounty rates) with Corofin getting their hands on all of them.
Of those that have gone past the 45 Corofin have won possession 60% of the time (12 – 8). This is good – for intercounty Championship games the kickout team wins x% of kickouts past the 45. Looking at the kickout map they prefer hitting the wings in and around the 65 – and avoid the dangerous middle between the 45 & 65. They don’t rely on Marks – only the one across the two games

Corofin v Ballintubber 2019 Connacht Club SF

In many ways the game was similar to the 2018 Connacht final (review here) in that the overall numbers (possessions, shots, Conversion Rates) were quite close but Corofin never really felt in any trouble. The below is an extract from that 2018 game

But the main reason for their easy third was due to a devastating 15 minute spell from the 33^rd minute onwards. In that period Corofin had 16 possessions taking eleven shots … and scoring 1 – 08 (Conversion Rate of 82% with an Expt Pts +3.06).

Corofin had less of a surge in this game but they again showed their clinical nature in the third quarter scoring 1 – 04 from just 5 shots (Expt pts of +3.53) enabling them to ease out to a six point lead after 45 minutes. Ballintubber showed great battling qualities to get within one heading into injury time but the damage had been done.

In another way this game was very different from 2018. The 2018 version was a veritable turnover fest with 90 total possessions of which 58 (64%) were turnovers. Both teams were very careful with the ball here producing just the 63 total possessions in total of which 28 (44%) were turnovers. Both teams played “keep ball” for long periods with 20 of the possessions having a string of at least 10 passes.

That volume of possessions is not just low compared to the 2018 game but very low full stop. On a straight line conversion to a 70 minute intercounty game (they are not the same thing with injury time etc. but this is just for illustrative purposes!) those 63 possessions grade out at 74. The average intercounty Championship total in 2018 & 2019 was 90. In 150 games since 2015 only one game – Fermanagh v Monaghan in 2018 – came in at lower than 74. This was a possession game brought to the extremes.

 

Corofin’s defense

Much has been made (both by myself and others) of the Corofin attack. It wasn’t at full throttle here (50% Conversion Rate from play; 1 – 05 from 12) though the depth of their attack can be gauged by the fact that (a) their three goal shots didn’t come from the vaunted forwards but instead Kieron Molloy & Liam Silke and (b) Gary Sice was 0 – 03 from 3 on frees in 2018 but didn’t take one here when they went 0 – 05 from 5.

Instead of focussing on the attack it is work taking a quick look at their defence through the lens of Ballintubber shooting.

Ballintubber’s slow build up would appear not to have worked. Corofin were able to maintain as clean a “D” as you are likely to see allowing no shot at goal and just two attempts from the very outer edge of the shooting arc.

But the slow build up is not the sole reason for this paucity of close shooting. In the 2018 game (shot chart below) only three Ballintubber shots were taken close to goal despite it being a very different type of game.

In ~130 minutes of high level club football Corofin were able to keep Ballintubber to one goal attempt, did not allow a shot from a free from closer than 35 metres, and only allowed six of 28 point attempts (21%) from “inside”.

Corofin’s attack

Corofin produced an absolutely scintillating performance in the first half of the recent club final against Dr. Crokes. I threw up a few pieces on twitter (@dontfoul) around that performance and what follows is an amalgamation of those pieces with a bit more context.

It is important to note what this is not. It is not is a critique of how Corofin play. It is a review of how they played in one half of one game.

Corofin’s shooting

The first thing that jumped out when watching the game “live” was their shooting. In that first half against Dr. Crokes they attempted 15 shots with none coming from further out than ~23m.

That is an incredibly neat and tight shot chart. I tend to use an ad hoc arc around the D to give a visualisation of “inside”/”outside” shooting which I have overlaid on Corofin’s shots. In the Super 8s last year 45% of shots were taken inside that arc. 45%! Corofin were at 87% (13 of 15) with the two “outside” being on the edge of the arc.

Passing sequences

Taking a step back the next question is how Corofin managed to create such a neat shot chart. Below is the passing sequence for all 18 of their first half possessions and the result for same (excluding the very last move when the referee blew for half time just after the kickout was gathered).

Green is a successful pass, orange is where the pass did not go where anticipated but Corofin gathered/controlled the ball and red is a turnover from a pass.

There is probably a thesis there for someone in comparing that table to other teams, be they club or county. Passes per possession, hand pass to kick pass ratio, avg. length of kick pass, quantum of attacking passes to possession retention passes etc. But from a cursory review there are a few things that jump out

• Just how much green there is and the implication of assuredness whilst in control of the ball;
• Only one turnover in the tackle
• Only four, out of 128 passes, led to a turnover

That is not to say that the other 124 passes were perfect – far from it. There is quite a bit of oIrange in there but that in and of itself was a feature. Twice shots were blocked and regathered, at least five times unorthodox passes (fist through, toe pokes, kick through – you don’t always need to “go down on it”) successfully found a Corofin player. Corofin were alert to all possibilities at all times.

Visually Corofin were in utter control and the above table is just another way to show it. And that control was achieved with a variation in both tempo and style. The first three possessions took six passes apiece, contained two outfield solos and averaged ~20 seconds on the ball. The last point was a 20 pass string with five outfield solos and consumed 72seconds on the clock.

That control was evident even with a heightened volume of kick passes. More work is (definitely) needed here but it is important to stress that it is the type of kick that is emphasised here rather than the volume.

(As an aside ….. Patricia Lynch, the current senior performance analyst for Kerry, did a notational study of passing (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24748668.2017.1416526) showing that from 2014 – 2016 the ratio of kick passes to hand passes was 2.5:1 (~ 72% to 28%). Eamon Donoghue (https://www.irishtimes.com/sport/gaelic-games/gaelic-football/gaa-statistics-how-much-has-gaelic-football-changed-in-the-last-decade-1.3619732) in his piece in the Irish Times post last year’s all Ireland final showed a kick pass/hand pass ratio of 75%/25%)

Corofin, at a 30% kick pass ratio, were just above these norms but their attacking kick passes were immense and it is phenomenal that they only had a 3% turnover rate on all passes when we overlay the (subjective) nature of their kick passing.

Front 6 touches

So stepping away from the passing sequences (as I said you could create a thesis on this alone) the question becomes how they create this control. They are generally on point with their passing allowing them to attack the goal and almost point-blank refuse to take unnecessary shots. Joe Brolly eulogised on their understanding of movement and space in the Sunday Game and that got me thinking re how Corofin use their front six.

The above chart outlines the passing and movement on the ball of Corofin’s front six. In doing so you can see a few things that work into their game plan

• expanding it out to the full pitch it is rare for any of them to be on the ball in their own half – 5 touches between them (with Michael Lundy having four of them)
• Gary Sice (#10) is the main architect of the attacking kick; the front six had four kick passes combined from outside the 45 with all of them coming from him
• Michael Lundy (#11) preferred the right-hand side
• Michael Farragher’s (#14) natural habitat is a small rectangular box between the 13m & 20m lines in front of goal however if he collects the ball out the field he is carrying the ball directly towards the danger zone

But all that pales into insignificance when we see what the front six didn’t do. They stayed away from the No. 6 channel (yellow coloured rectangle in the above chart) altogether. Compare that to how other teams view the concept of space and where they try to get their playmakers on the ball.

Could we have seen it coming?

That first half display against Dr. Crokes was outstanding. Unfortunately (despite my endless invocations to people on Twitter to back up their data) I have lost my copy of the 2018 final v Nemo Rangers but commentary points to how they blitzed both Nemo in that final and Slaughtneil in 2016.

What I do have however is the semi-final v Gaoth Dobhair. And the comparison of the two first halves is as scary as it is striking.

Part of the narrative around Corofin’s displays in the finals is that Croke Park suits them. The wide open space allows their forwards to run all sorts of angles whilst the outfield players can find space to pick a pass. Scarily Corofin were even more clinical in the first half of the Gaoth Dobhair game, down in Seán Mac Diarmada Park, than they were up in Croke Park. I mean … 2 – 07 from 11 shots in an AI semi-final.

Once again the shooting was very considered with only three shots coming from outside the aforementioned artificial zone (I wonder did Jason Leonard have to do punishment laps the next night at training for that shot out to the right ….).

Across the two halves analysed that’s 81% (21 of 26) of shots coming from “inside” with only one shot that could be considered in any way away from the arc with 35% of all attempts from play being goal attempts.

Again, a reminder that the 2018 Super8s saw 45% of shots from “inside” with 10.4% of attempts from play being goal attempts.

Passing sequences v Gaoth Dobhair

The passing was not as slick as against Dr. Crokes in that seven passes led to a turnover but the avoidance of turnovers in the tackle is evident with just the one ball dislodged early on.

All the main ingredients for that first half performance v Dr Crokes were evident in their first half display v Gaoth Dobhair.